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Introduction 
In 1833, the United States and Russia came to terms on what is 
known as the Commercial and Navigation Treaty of 1832, from here 
on out referred to as the Treaty of 1832. This became the first trade 
agreement between the two countries, thanks to which Russia began 
to import vast amounts of cotton and agricultural equipment. In 1911, 
the United States abrogated the Treaty of 1832, a result of the Russian 
policies regarding emigration and the treatment of Jewish Americans 
in Russia. Subsequently, certain Russian nationalists denounced U.S. 
as meddling in Imperial Russian affairs, and in a surprising move 
proposed the dissolution of the agreement should be endorsed by the 
Duma immediately. Russian nationalists believed that the United 
States would be negatively affected by the treaty’s abrogation, but not 
the Russian Empire. The nationalists further claimed that Jewish 
Americans controlled the government of the United States, and 
President Howard Taft had succumbed to their pressure.  
Previous literature on Russian nationalists deals primarily with 
the nationalist’s anti-Semitic stance particularly that of the actual 
Russian Nationalist Party; however, what historians have not 
discussed are the economic views of the Russian nationalists, as well 
as their attempted involvement in international politics. Despite what 
appears to be only an anti-Semitic stance in its dealings with the 
United States over the Treaty of 1832, this moment provided the 
nationalists with an opportunity to propose to the Duma the need for 
economic independence from the United States, or a Russia for 
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Russians. This was done through the proposal of annulment of the 
treaty, and an increased duty on all goods originating in the United 
States. Yet the Russian textile industry relied heavily on cotton from 
the United States, and had the nationalists achieved their economic 
policies of creating a ‘tariff war’ with the United States, the Russian 
textile industry would have collapsed on the eve of World War I.  
 
The Treaty of 1832 and the Jewish Question 
The history of the Treaty of 1832 begins in 1783 when Francis 
Dana, the United States Ambassador to Russia, believed negotiations 
on a trade agreement with Imperial Russia would soon begin. Despite 
his efforts, Dana proved unsuccessful at procuring an arrangement 
with Russia. Momentum for a commercial treaty did not return until 
the presidency of John Quincy Adams. After the Russo-Turkish War 
of 1828 to 1829, when Russia gained territory from Turkey, a change 
of heart occurred. This also coincided with Turkey and the United 
States coming to terms with the fact that, “American merchants 
should have in Turkey the same treatment as those of the most 
favored nations.”1 The American Minister to St. Petersburg John 
Randolph, in response to the Secretary of State Martin Van Buren, 
presented a treaty that mirrored the Turkish agreement to the Russian 
administration. Yet Russia did not come to terms with the United 
States until James Buchanan was appointed Minister to Russia.2 
Buchanan oversaw the arduous process of negotiating with 
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Count Nesselrode. The American 
Minister to Russia further spent his time familiarizing himself with 
French, a diplomatic language of the time, as well as international 
law. This endeavor enabled Minister Buchanan to fully comprehend 
the documentation completed by Minister Randolph who, as 
 
1  Issac Morris Schottenstein, “The Abrogation of the Treaty of 1832 Between 
the United States and Russia” (master’s thesis, Ohio State University, 1960), 2. 
2  Ibid., 1-2. 
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previously mentioned, negotiated with the Russians. Buchanan 
recognized the United States would benefit significantly from the 
proposed treaty, but demonstrated to the representatives of the 
imperial court the possible advantages for the Empire. The minister 
indicated to the official of the court the necessity to expand trade in 
the Russian Empire and of the potential to diversify their industry. In 
spite of these proposed benefits, Nicholas I rejected the terms of the 
agreement. Count Nesselrode, a supporter of the treaty, aided Minister 
Buchanan in altering the disputed points of contention in said treaty. 
On December 17, 1832, after the modifications to the agreement, 
Minister Buchanan presented the Commercial and Navigation Treaty 
to the appropriate diplomats. The following day, surprising Buchanan, 
Nicholas I, “had signed the order that the treaty should be executed. 
That afternoon Count Nesselrode and Buchanan met at the Foreign 
Office and signed the treaty.” The Treaty of 1832 was ratified by 
Imperial Russia on January 8, 1833, with the United States following 
suit on April 8, 1833, and finalized with an exchange of ratifications 
in Washington D.C. on May 11, 1833.3 
Of particular interest is the fact that during the course of 
negotiations of the thirteen articles discussed, only Article I did not 
receive attention, nor was it emphasized by the imperial court of 
Russia. Article I fundamentally altered the relationship between the 
two countries. But why? Due to the significance that the article carries 
we must consider the following statement verbatim. 
 
There shall be between the territories of the high contracting 
parties, a reciprocal liberty of commerce and navigation. The 
inhabitants of the respective States shall, mutually have 
 
3  Ned Herman Rubenstein, “The Abrogation of the 1832 Treaty of Navigation 
and Commerce between the United States and Russia: Influence of a Minority 
Group on International Affairs” (master’s thesis, University of Nebraska at Omaha, 
1970), 1-3. 
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liberty to enter ports, places and rivers of the territories of 
each party, wherever foreign commerce is permitted. They 
shall be at liberty to sojourn and reside in all parts 
whatsoever of said territories, in order to attend to their 
affairs and they shall enjoy, to that effect, the same security 
and protection as natives of the country wherein they reside, 
on condition of their submitting to the laws and ordinances 
there prevailing and particularly to the regulations in force 
concerning commerce.4 
 
Article I did not have to be invoked until 1865, when Russia 
began to detain Jewish Americans travelling in the country. In 1864 
Bernard Bernstein, a former Jewish Russian who became a citizen of 
the United States, visited his family in Poland. During his time in 
Poland, Bernstein was incarcerated by the Russian police “for evading 
his military obligations.” Subsequently, after much deliberation 
between the United States Minister and Imperial Russia, Bernstein 
was released, perhaps only because of his American citizenship.5  
Further issues soon arose and the tipping point appears to have 
occurred in mid-1880, when officials in St. Petersburg tried to deport 
Jewish businessman Henry Pinkos. The United States embassy, upon 
hearing of the plight of Pinkos, secured an extension for the 
businessman, but eventually St. Petersburg ordered Pinkos and his 
family out of the capital. This occurred despite Pinkos not completing 
his business. Upon boarding, officials requested Pinkos’ passport, 
however, Pinkos had placed his identification in his checked baggage. 
 
4  National Archives United States (NAUS), RG59, Records of the Department 
of State relating to Political Relations between the United States and Russia 
(M5144), reel 6, 711.612/56.  The author of this document is unknown due to 
illegible signature/initials, but was written to the Department of State on November 
25, 1911. 
5  Rubenstein, “The Abrogation of the 1832 Treaty of Navigation and 
Commerce,” 10-11. 
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Unable to provide the appropriate documentation on the spot officials 
sent Pinkos to prison.6 After much deliberation between Russia and 
the United States, St. Petersburg released Pinkos, and allowed him to 
return to the United States. The importance of this particular incident 
is the interpretation of Article I by Secretary of State Evarts, who 
“established the policy that the privileges accorded by the Treaty 
applied to all alike without regard to the religious body to which they 
belonged,” however, the “Russian officials [who] viewed the matter, 
foreigners of any particular creed had only the same privileges as 
were enjoyed by Russian subjects of the same creed.”7 Imperative to 
the argument are a couple of points that did not garner the necessary 
attention by the diplomats of the imperial court and the United States.  
Given that the rise of anti-Semitism is much too broad of a 
subject to discuss, herein we will concern ourselves with the issues 
that arose between the United States and Imperial Russia. First we 
should consider laws existing before, and immediately after, the 
signing of the Treaty of 1832. In 1824, a law stipulated that, “all 
foreign Jews, regardless of their citizenship, even into places where 
Russian Jews are admitted, as well as the entry into Russia of Russian 
Jews who repudiated their country, is prohibited.”8 This is of interest 
when one takes into consideration the ongoing negotiations soon 
thereafter. Furthermore, “in accordance with Russian Legislation of 
1835 and 1839 it will be seen that certain categories of foreign Jews 
were allowed residence in Russia.”9 Yet these matters appear to have 
gone unnoticed by the United States and the Russian Empire at the 
time, which more than likely contributed to a rise in tensions between 
 
6  Schottenstein, “The Abrogation of the Treaty of 1832 between the United 
States and Russia,” 8-9. 
7  Rubenstein, “The Abrogation of the 1832 Treaty of Navigation and 
Commerce,” 24. 
8  NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6, 711.612/78, Dispatch Translation of Rossiya, 
Curtis Guild to the Secretary of State, December 14, 1911, 3. 
9  Ibid., 3.  
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the two countries once the issue of Jewish faith became apparent to 
the United States several decades later.   
Hostilities toward the Jewish population grew with the 
assassination of Alexander II by revolutionaries, of whom one was 
Jewish, and contributed to an increase of anti-Semitism in the 
imperial court. Alexander III further exacerbated hostilities due to his 
anti-Semitic stance, as did his Minister of the Interior Nicolas 
Ignatiev, who permitted pogroms and initiated legislation against the 
Jewish population of Russia, thus leading to increased immigration of 
Jews outside of the empire.10 The Russian Empire additionally 
believed that “American Jews are divided into two classes: 1) those 
who were formerly Russian subjects, and 2) all the others … if a 
Russian subject becomes the subject of another country without 
soliciting the permission of the Russian government, he is (according 
to Russian law) still considered a Russian subject.”11 The role of the 
Jewish population in the Revolution of 1905 further increased 
tensions in the imperial court and in the western border regions of the 
empire along the borders of, “the Kingdom of Poland where they 
constituted a large number of organized workingmen.”12 The 
Kishinev massacre also further demonstrates the growth of the anti-
Semitism.13 These conflicts contributed to the rise of discontent of 
 
10  Rubenstein, “The Abrogation of the 1832 Treaty of Navigation and 
Commerce,” 5. 
11  NAUS, RG59, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of 1832,” 
General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30, 1911, 
Echoes in the English and American Press, Russko Slovo. General Consul 
Snodgrass, in this dispatch 711.612/87, complied and translated twenty eight 
newspapers. 
12  Rubenstein, “The Abrogation of the 1832 Treaty of Navigation and 
Commerce,” 6-7. 
13  NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6, 711.612/87, “Abrogation of the Treaty of 
1832,” Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30, 1911, Russkia Vedomosti.  
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Jewish Americans and subsequently led them to encourage the United 
States government to abrogate the Treaty of 1832. 
Yet despite these issues between the Russian Empire and the 
United States, trade flourished and by 1910 the United States exported 
more than $78.5 million worth of merchandise to Imperial Russia. 
This was largely comprised of $50 million in cotton and 
approximately $11 million in agricultural machinery, whereas the 
United States imported only $14.9 million worth of goods from 
Russia.14 In spite of the highly successful trade agreement, by 1911 
the House of Representatives passed a decree, by a margin of three 
hundred votes to one, to abrogate the Treaty of 1832.15 Curtis Guild 
delivered the decision that the United States had rescinded the treaty 
to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei D. Sazanov.16 
 
Russia for Russians: The Russian Nationalist Party 
The response in Imperial Russian was varied. For the purposes of 
this article the reply of the Russian Nationalists will be explored. First 
we must begin with the respective origins of the Russian Nationalist 
Party and its constituency, which profoundly affected their decision-
making. With the legalization of political parties, after the Revolution 
of 1905, a group of noblemen from the western border region of 
Imperial Russia formed the Russian Nationalist Party in 1909. The 
landed nobility in the region held the perception that a class-based 
society greatly threatened their livelihood, “which had always 
 
14  NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of 
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30, 
1911 , Echoes in the English and American Press, 3. 
15  NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of 
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30, 
1911, At Last, “Novoye Vremia.” 
16  Rubenstein, “The Abrogation of the 1832 Treaty of Navigation and 
Commerce,” 1. 
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justified its dominance in terms of status rather than class.”17 As the 
industrial revolution came to Russia the noblemen of the region 
increased their profits in agriculture. This group recognized that rather 
than earning meager pay from renting the land to peasants, “owning 
an estate now meant owning a source of income.”18 The Russian 
Nationalist Party’s primary constituency, the gentry, could be found 
in the western border regions as well, as the area “was highly fertile 
… with extensive commercial agriculture,”19 eventually providing a 
strong political base.  
Originally the constituency of the Russian Nationalist Party 
supported the autocracy, however, due to the industrialization of the 
country that threatened the landed nobility’s existence the tsar began 
to lose the support of party members. Policies enacted by the Minister 
of Finance Sergei Witte for the development of industry in Russia 
“disadvantaged the agrarian sector of the economy. All this distanced 
the nobles from a state that had historically been their protector.”20 
Furthermore, these articles of legislation essentially led the noblemen 
to create a political party that represented their ideology to the tsar 
and explains why they “feared industrialists and refused to cooperate 
with them.”21 However, it is worth noting that this organization was, 
“not so much a party of nationalism as a party of the dominant 
Russian nationality in a multinational empire. They sought to achieve 
the complete domination by the Russians within the empire.”22 
 
 
17  Robert Edelman, Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution: The 
Nationalist Party 1907-1917 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University 
Press, 1980), 3. 
18  Ibid. 
19  Ibid., 6. 
20  Ibid., 3. 
21  Ibid., 174. 
22  Ibid., 10. 
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Such a political statement is attributed to their region of origin 
and constituency, but certainly does not justify the Nationalist Party’s 
anti-Semitic stance. The landed nobility of the Russian Nationalist 
Party was typically from the western border region of Imperial 
Russia. The area was historically a Polish territory prior to 1794 
where the “Polish nobles dominated landholding[s].” The control the 
Polish held alienated the Russian noblemen, and exacerbated by the 
peasantry, where the “Jews had extensive influence over urban 
commerce.”23 After the failed Polish uprising in 1863, Russian 
noblemen’s precarious living situation improved as a result of the 
autocratic state. Despite these improvements, the Russian nobility still 
had “competition on the land from Polish landlords and in the towns 
from Jewish merchants.”24  
This perceived threat continued despite the Polish and Jewish 
populations being minorities in the area. The anti-Semitic stance held 
by the Russian nobility is only further emphasized by the perception 
that Jews had participated in the Revolution of 1905 and opposed the 
tsar. Of particular interest is the Jewish participation in the 
revolutionary activities in the western border region, “which roughly 
corresponded to the territory of the Pale Settlement to which Jewish 
residence was restricted.”25 Thus, “the nationalism of the west 
Russian gentry was the product of their sense of inferiority and fear of 
non-Russian national groups.”26 These beliefs, and the Nationalist 
Party’s desire to only concern themselves with their constituency, led 
them to voice the concerns of the “Russian landlords,” that “raised the 
demand ‘Russia for Russians,” but “the Nationalist Party’s principles 
 
 
23  Robert Edelman, “The Russian Nationalist Party and the Political Crisis of 
1909,” Russian Review 34, no. 1 (1975): 25. 
24  Ibid., 25-27.  
25  Edleman, Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution, 50-51. 
26  Ibid., 105. 
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were nearly always consistent with the most basic pragmatic interests 
of its constituents.”27 When considering the abovementioned we now 
should be able to understand the following response by the Russian 
nationalists to the United States. 
According to the Russian nationalists, President Taft’s decision 
to support Congress on the issue of abrogation originated from the 
influence that Jewish Americans exerted in the United States 
government. This response can be attributed to the Russian treatment 
and policies toward Jewish Americans, as General Consul John H. 
Snodgrass stated that President Taft personally opposed the 
abrogation of the Treaty of 1832. Nonetheless, Jewish Americans at 
this point began to demonstrate against treatment of American Jews in 
Russia. Such a response is attributed to Russian policies toward 
people of Jewish ancestry that stated, “No foreign Jews except 
bankers, heads of important commercial houses, brokers’ 
representatives, clerks and agents of commercial houses are permitted 
to enter Russia.”28 This further demonstrates the conflict with Article 
I of the Treaty of 1832. Furthermore, in the eyes of Russian 
nationalists such a verdict was due to “the congressmen” who 
intended to “influence Russia’s domestic laws by threatening to 
abrogate the treaty,”29 as “they [Jews] are strong on two positions, 
financial and political.”30 Russian nationalists charged that President 
Taft succumbed to “the public opinion of the Jewish population, 
27  Ibid., 48. 
28  NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6, 711.612/56, “Construction of Article I of 
Treaty of 1832 with Russia,” the initials of author are illegible, but appear to be JHP 
to the Secretary of State, November 25, 1911. 
29  NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogation of the Treaty of 
1832,” Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30, 1911; At Last, “Novoye 
Vremia.”  
30  NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of 
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30, 
1911, Messrs. Sulzer & Co., “Novoye Vremia.” 
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which represents a very considerable and well united number of 
electors…”31 The nationalists stated the presidential candidates were 
placating the Jewish population, as the United States at this time was 
preparing for the presidential election of 1912.  
Additionally, the nationalists professed that Jewish Americans, 
whom they saw as mostly former Russian subjects, had “the 
pretended purpose … to give the American Jews the right to come to 
Russia without any restrictions…"32 Ultimately, the nationalists’ 
support of legislation and laws that restricted the travels of Jews 
revolved around their belief that “during the time of the Revolution 
many Jews – socialists, anarchists, and revolutionists emigrated to 
America.”33 Such a belief can be attributed to increased anti-Semitism 
after the assassination of Alexander II. Thus, the nationalists believed 
Jewish émigrés constituted a monumental threat to the stability of 
Imperial Russia. Yet this provided an opportunity for the Russian 
nationalists to propose their own legislation aimed at reducing the 
United States’ importance in Russia. The Russian nationalists advised 
the Duma to support the abrogation of the Treaty of 1832. The 
nationalists declared in the newspaper Novoe Vremia, “instead of the 
low duty, a higher duty will be charged on American goods. The 
further growth of American trade in Russia will be impossible; 
American goods will be displaced by England and Germany.”34  
31  NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of 
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30, 
1911, Echoes in the English and American Press, “Russkoe Slovo.” 
32  NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of 
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30, 
1911, Messrs. Sulzer & Co., “Novoye Vremia.” 
33  NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of 
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30, 
1911, Question About American Jews, “Russkoye Slovo.” 
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Russian nationalists recognized the broad economic influence of 
the United States in Russia. This led the nationalists to seek greater 
economic freedom from the United States, particularly in the cotton 
industry. At this time, Russia imported over 50 percent of its cotton, 
of which up to 90 percent came from the North American republic.35 
To dissuade the United States from exporting goods to Russia, and for 
the Russian textile industry to not import cotton, the Nationalists 
formally proposed a piece of legislation that would increase the duties 
on American imported goods by 100 percent.36 The Russian 
nationalists believed that Russian Turkestan in Central Asia could 
provide the empire with the necessary supplies of cotton to maintain 
the Russian textile industry. According to sources reported from the 
Golos Moskvi the increase in cotton yields in Turkestan could 
“release” not only Russia but also “the European cotton industry from 
the American yoke.”37 From 1905 to 1909, exports to the United 
States amounted to roughly $18,693,500 while Russia imported 
$177,047,000 worth of goods. The Nationalists believed that the 
34  NAUS, M5144, RG59, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of 
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30, 
1911, At last, “Novoye Vremia.” 
35  NAUS, M5144, RG59, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of 
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30, 
1911, Imperial Russia at this point imported 10 million poods (a pood is equivalent 
to 36.1127 pounds) of American cotton, which is indicated in the article A Hasty 
Bill. Russia’s textile industry required 23 million poods and is discussed at length in 
Shooting at One’s People. The figure of 90 percent is derived from the United 
States exporting 10 million poods out of the 11.5 million Russia purportedly 
imported. Although one must additionally consider figures in other newspapers in 
Russia that state this range is from 8 to 10 million poods a year.  
36  NAUS, M5114, RG59, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of 
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30, 
1911, A Hasty Bill, “Commersant.” 
37  NAUS, M5114, RG59, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of 
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30, 
1911, Russian-American Trade, “Golos Moskvi.” 
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United States would be the only negatively impacted party by the 
nullification of the trade agreement, and it is not surprising that they 
expressed such a sentiment, leading them to state that “the farmers of 
the Great American Republic will be the first to feel all the 
consequences of the political mistake of their representatives.”38 The 
Nationalists sought to counterattack the United States Congress by 
enforcing a sort of Russian economic sanction on the United States; 
more or less a tariff war. 
Despite this view, more cautious papers doubted the ability of 
Turkestan to support the growing demand of the empire and stated the 
Russian economy would falter greatly if the United States abolished 
the contract. At this time the Russian textile industry necessitated 
roughly 23 million poods of cotton to sustain production, and it was 
estimated that the Turkestan cotton industry would not exceed more 
than 10 to 13 million poods per year. Approximately 2,736 Russian 
factories needed cotton, and employed close to 840,520 people, 
roughly 43 percent of the entire workforce in Russia. Utro Rossii 
stated that with the substantial increase of duty the cost of cotton 
could hinder productivity, and if Russia did not import cotton from 
the United States then it was surmised at least half of the textile 
workers might become unemployed. This, in the opinion of the paper, 
“cannot be considered anything else but a shot at one’s own 
people.”39 The newspapers in Moscow and St. Petersburg detailed the 
monumental increase of cotton production in Central Asia and 
Turkestan. However, harvests did not approach the levels to support 
the country as the nationalists hoped for, despite the development of 
the cotton industry in Turkestan. They did not take into consideration 
38  NAUS, M5114, RG59, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of 
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30, 
1911, Golos Moskvi, “Russian-American Trade.” 
39  NAUS, M5114, RG59, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of 
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30, 
1911, Utro Rossii, “Shooting At One’s Own People.” 
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the impact and the subsequent response by the people of Turkestan to 
the modernization efforts in the region. 
Modernization of the Cotton Industry in Turkestan 
According to John Whitman cotton cultivation in Turkestan dates 
to the time before the birth of Christ. To grow cotton in Central Asia 
can be considered a time-consuming and laborious process, and as a 
result the cultivation requirements revolved around the domestic 
needs. Not until the eighteenth century did “trade relations, albeit on a 
low level, were established with Russia on a fairly regular basis.”40 
Yet Turkestan cotton did not appeal to the Russians because of its 
high costs and low quality. To manufacture cotton the native 
inhabitants, who held small family parcels of between two and two 
and a half desiatinas (one desiatina equals 2.7 acres), cultivated the 
land through traditional methods that “were primitive to an extreme 
degree.”41 For instance, to till the soil farmers relied upon “an ancient 
native implement which did not turn, but only loosened the soil … 
since the cotton plant requires depth, three such plowings were 
necessary.”42  
Furthermore, the “native varieties were of short staple and their 
bolls opened only partially, so the bolls were broken off the stem in 
harvesting.”43 These production procedures contributed to a period of 
almost two to three months to harvest one desiatina, plus the 
transportation time from Tashkent to the Orenburg railhead amounted 
to five to six months. Upon delivery it was not uncommon to see a 35 
percent loss of cotton.44 Thus, to meet the needs of the textile industry 
Russia relied on cotton from abroad, almost exclusively from the 
40  John Whitman, “Turkestan Cotton in Imperial Russia,” American Slavic 
and East European Review 15, no. 2 (1956): 190.  
41  Ibid., 190. 
42  Ibid., 191. 
43  Ibid. 
44  Ibid., 191-192. 
William Cohoon 
 
   19 
United States. During the American Civil War cotton exports were 
severely limited and, “the growing importance of trade with Asia,” 
coupled with this shortage of cotton from the United States “were 
major factors leading to the Russian conquest of Turkestan in the 
1860s.”45 
The Russian occupation of Turkestan did not begin extensively 
until the military campaign of 1863. Imperial Russia’s desire to 
expand into Central Asia originated from a belief for a need to 
“access markets, as well as support in any potential contest with Great 
Britain.”46 The loss in the Crimean War had damaged Russian 
prestige abroad and military leaders believed that the conquest of 
Central Asia could perhaps alter such a perception. However, there 
was not a coherent plan by the imperial court, as most wished to avoid 
a conflict with the British. Yet strong-willed military leaders pressed 
on in Central Asia and by 1866 Alexander II “signed an official 
decree of annexation.”47 General Konstantin Petrovich fon Kaufman 
was appointed governor of the region, and arrived in Tashkent in 
1867. Kaufman “envisioned the city as the embodiment of a new 
civilization,” and further, “believed … Russian [influence] … would 
transform Turkestan into a productive and progressive tsarist 
province.”48 Subsequently, Governor-General Kaufman developed a 
plan to increase the cotton yields in Turkestan.  
In the early 1870s the governor ordered two experts on cotton to 
the United States to study the various varieties in use in order to find a 
more suitable seed for Turkestan. Upon their return, the specialists 
provided two options of cotton strains: Sea Island and Upland. Further 
efforts with the Sea Island variety proved that this strain could not be 
 
45  David Pretty, “The Cotton Industry in Russia and the Soviet Union,” 
National overview and the USSR, Textile conference IISH, Nov. 11-13, 2004, 13.  
46  Jeff Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 1865-1923 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 19. 
47  Ibid., 19-21. 
48  Ibid., 32. 
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used in the region, due to the aridity of Central Asia. Using the 
Upland class, the Russian Imperial court created posts that specialized 
in growing seedlings to be delivered to cultivators in the area. What 
became known as the Emperor’s Plantation, located in Merv, 
established itself as the eminent farmstead in the region. Here local 
inhabitants could purchase, or rent, agricultural equipment and learn 
new techniques in native dialects or Russian. The plantation provided 
seedlings at an affordable cost to agriculturalists. As a result, by 1884 
close to three hundred desiatinas grew the American strain, and by 
1889 44,500, “or 52 percent of the total sown area.”49 The native 
strain was essentially nonexistent by the beginning of the twentieth 
century.50  
According to Imperial Russia the expansion of the cotton harvest 
in the region was attributed to “the extremely favourable economic 
conditions, the Russian government having helped its cultivation both 
by the imposition of a high tariff on imported cotton and by the 
reduction of the land tax.”51 To further stimulate the cultivation of 
cotton in Turkestan, in 1900, Russia offered tax incentives. Typically 
tax on a property was 10 percent of the “expected” harvest. However, 
if one cultivated cotton the tax on the speculated yield was lower. 
This occurred despite the fact that grains generally “produced 4-5 
times as much income.”52 This tax incentive was applicable only to 
those who grew the American strain of cotton.53 
The Russian Empire advanced modernization in the area through 
the construction of railroads, the Trans-Caspian and Orenburg 
Railways. In 1896, the Trans-Caspian Railroad connected with 
49  Whitman, “Turkestan Cotton in Imperial Russia,” 194. 
50  Ibid., 194-195. 
51  Nikolay Ivanovich Malahowski, “Russian Turkestan and Its 
Products,”Journal of Finance and Trade and Industry Gazette (St. Petersburg, 
1910), 5. 
52  Whitman, “Turkestan Cotton in Imperial Russia,” 199. 
53  Ibid. 
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Tashkent, which aided in increasing the sown area of cotton in the 
region. From 1898 to 1900, it is estimated that land under cultivation 
increased by 54 percent. Similarly, upon completion of the Orenburg 
section, the region experienced growth from between 200 thousand 
desiatinas to 423 thousand before the outbreak of World War I.54 In 
the early 1850s Turkestan supplied Russia with close to 52 thousand 
poods of cotton, less than 5 percent of all imports; however, exports 
slightly surpassed 14 million poods in 1915 with a total 524 thousand 
sown desiatinas.55 This total was the highest yield the area 
experienced, and would not be attained again until the 1920s. These 
events contributed to the unprecedented yields that Russian 
nationalists believed would sustain the Russian textile industry and 
permit economic independence from the United States. Turkestan, 
however, experienced many issues that hindered the ability of Russia 
to maximize the region’s capabilities to its fullest potential in order to 
produce affordably priced cotton for industrialists.  
The Reality of Modernization Efforts in Turkestan 
This examination of the Russian effort to modernize Turkestan 
reveals what may be seen by Western scholars as an ambiguous 
approach to implement consistent reforms to develop the region. 
Nonetheless, it is imperative to note the difficulties encountered by 
Imperial Russia while modernizing the territory. Central Asia’s 
climate must first be considered when focusing on the issues that 
contributed to inefficient means of production. According to the 
Imperial Russian research, “at this time Turkestan enjoys a far greater 
number of cloudless days than any other part of the Empire and in that 
respect resembles that of Cairo,” although, it is further noted, “the 
54  Ibid., 198. 
55  Ibid., 192 and 203. 
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rainfall, however, being insufficient, artificial irrigation is used.”56 
Irrigation of Turkestan proved to be complicated endeavor for 
Imperial Russia. Several accounts throughout the development of the 
region attest to the dryness and the lack of water sources in the region, 
or comment on the ineffective measures implemented for the 
construction of canals. During his trip in the 1870s, Eugene Schuyler 
had this to say about a project in the area:  “There is a project at 
Tashkent to irrigate this steppe by the construction of a large canal 
from the Syr Darya above Hodjent … still no careful survey has been 
made, and it is declared by many that such a canal is impossible, and 
that all money spent before as survey is made is simply thrown away. 
The work on the canal has, however, already begun.”57 Schuyler also 
described the area as “a parched and barren waste, although at one or 
two places there are wells and cisterns of brackish and unpleasant 
water. 58 
General Kaufman attempted to address the issue of expanding the 
canals of Turkestan by requesting a geographical survey of the 
Golodnaya Steppe in 1869. In 1870, Baron Aminov reported, “the 
Golodnaya Steppe sloped toward the Syr Darya and the Aral Sea and 
suggested that the Zaravshan River would be more 
suitable…However, the Zaravshan…lacked volume and uniformity of 
flow, and the planners had little choice but to proceed with the 
irrigation   of   the   Golodnaya   Steppe by   bringing   water  from   the   Syr         
Darya.”59 Subsequently, a military engineer presented a design 
to irrigate 200,000 desiatinas, where construction of the 
waterway began in 
56  Malahowski, Russian Turkestan and Its Products, 3. 
57  Eugene Schuyler and VV Grigor’ev, Turkistan: notes of a journey in 
Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara and Kuldja, vol. II, (Scribner, Armstrong & 
Co., 1877), 227. 
58  Ibid. 
59  Ian Mately, “The Golodnaya Steppe: A Russian Irrigation Venture in 
Central Asia,” Geographical Review 60, no. 3 (1970): 333. 
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1872, but was abandoned by 1879. Construction of the channels can 
at best be described as tedious and laborious. Russian officials forced 
unpaid native rural laborers to build the canals, thus alienating the 
populace of the region, who named the project “Tonghiz Ariq, or pig 
canal … The worst possible insult from a Muslim.”60 Future attempts 
to irrigate the region met similar with failures due to the high cost of 
construction, inability to purchase land from the native population, 
horrible working conditions that alienated the labor force, and 
ineffective machinery. All of which contributed greatly to the 
inefficiency of development. Foreign investors made offers to aid 
Imperial Russia; however officials declined the proposals.61 
During the construction of the canals, Russian officials forced the 
inhabitants to work without pay and in poor working conditions, thus 
eliciting a negative reaction. Not only did the undesirable 
environment contribute to an unwilling labor unit, but representatives 
of the imperial court could not implement an educational plan to 
demonstrate new techniques in irrigation to the workforce. Count 
K.K. Pahlen, during his tenure in the region as the head of the 
Senatorial Investigation of Turkestan, noted the following: “I 
examined many plans for terracing the fields, for improved drainage 
and water conservation, but all would have necessitated a prolonged 
period for the reeducation of the population and the abandonment of 
old established technique, while the novel methods introduced by the 
Russian engineers had so far yielded very meager results.”62 
Additionally, Count Pahlen stated that the lack of a proper university 
in Russia at the time where one may learn horticulture contributed to 
the ineffective training. This resulted in many “former railway and 
mining engineers who had learnt science or irrigation in situ, or, at 
 
60  Ibid. 
61  Ibid., 332-337.  
62  Count K.K. Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan Being the Memoirs of Count K.K. 
Pahlen, 1908-1909 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 92. 
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best, men with a technical education at a secondary school level” 
becoming engineers of the irrigation projects. The Count added, 
“under these conditions mistakes and failures were unavoidable.”63 
Administrative difficulties included an oversight of the seedling 
plantations set up to aid the expansion of the American strain of 
cotton at a low cost. Although relatively successful due to the 
affordable cost of the seedlings, the farmsteads set up to sell, and or 
rent agricultural machinery proved to be a failure. Russian officials 
did not take into consideration the poverty of the Turkestan 
population. In addition to this the Russian administrators did not 
understand the traditional landholdings of the peasants. Many of the 
people who held land possessed small parcels, and for those who had 
larger estates they typically used the property for animal husbandry. 
This severely limited the incorporation of modern equipment to 
improve the process of cultivation and rendered the equipment of 
little value its owners. The shortage of Russian agricultural specialists 
in the region provided by the Agriculture Department exacerbated the 
situation.  For example, in 1911 there were only three or four such 
professionals that resided in Turkestan, all of whom did not specialize 
in cotton.64  
The oversight of land rights proved to be problematic. For 
instance, “in 1873 local Russian officials worked out a measure, and 
soon thereafter secured its application, transferring title to all 
Turkestan lands to the Russian state.”65 Officials believed had they 
not pursued such a course with the indigenous people, Imperial Russia 
would have appeared weak, and had the natives retained their 
property they would more than likely have refused to sell the land to 
the Russians. However, this was designed “to break up the power of 
63  Ibid. 
64  Whitman, “Turkestan Cotton in Imperial Russia,” 195-196. 
65  Ibid., 196. 
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the local aristocracy and the secular strength of the Moslem clergy.”66 
Ultimately this movement wound down, but the misstep proved that 
officials did not understand that the “Turkestan peasant had a 
different attitude toward his land than his Russian counterpart.”67 The 
peasants of Turkestan invested significant amounts of labor to 
maintain their parcel, and as a result of owning only several desiatinas 
the family often invested their efforts into cultivating crops that 
reaped a larger profit, thus creating a stronger bond with their 
property.68 Nonetheless, not only did Russian officials not 
comprehend the magnitude of native affinity for their land, but 
business ventures in the region sought to exploit this economically, as 
well. 
Count Pahlen’s seminal piece on his tenure investigating the 
corruption in Russian Turkestan provides a valuable first person 
account of such dealings by the private sector in the region. Pahlen 
noted many creditors offered to purchase cotton and corn from the 
local agriculturalists, and he further detailed how this contributed to 
the widespread cultivation of the crop.69 John Whitman provides 
greater detail about the consequences in such matters. Creditors 
exploited the recent Russian policy of permitting private industry in 
the region. Here the firms, “organized staffs of agents to buy cotton 
against future delivery with cash advances to the peasants.”70 
Naturally, farmers in Turkestan agreed to such an endeavor as they 
used more of their land for the cultivation of cotton as a result of the 
price paid for the strain of cotton from the United States. Farmers did 
so despite an interest rate that often approached 60 percent.71  
 
66  Ibid. 
67  Ibid., 197. 
68  Ibid., 196-197. 
69  Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan Being the Memoirs of Count K.K. Pahlen, 
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Agrarians put their parcel of land up as the collateral for the 
advance and frequently defaulted when they did not generate a high 
enough yield at harvest time. Furthermore, with the modernization of 
ginning, working with a plethora of natives became cumbersome and 
caused firms to deal less frequently with native farmers. These factors 
contributed to “200,000 landless agricultural workers.”72 Eventually, 
this led Count Pahlen to explicitly explain the potential threat this had 
to the overall livelihood of Turkestan, as many farmers stopped 
producing grains in order to earn more money through creditors. By 
this point Pahlen stated, “There arose a shortage of corn, and 
subsequently of bread, which in this region had been ridiculously 
cheap … At about this time, too, the banks ceased to be interested in 
cotton as before…”73 Exacerbating the discontent amongst the 
populace is additionally seen with the introduction of the railroad, as, 
“in a word the construction of the railway means the absolute and 
final russification of the middle zone of Central Asia.”74 Contributing 
further to the discontent of the people of Turkestan was the 
construction of the railway. 
Officials of the imperial court, and in particular General 
Kaufman, believed the railway would “transform Turkestan into a 
productive and progressive tsarist province”75 which it undeniably 
did, but at what cost? First and foremost, the railway created and 
reinforced an imperial identity. For instance, to commemorate the 
opening of the railroad stations along the route of the Trans-Caspian, 
officials of the Russian Empire played “military music,” consequently 
in response to this: “Turkoman women and children began to raise 
loud cries of lamentation, while the men threw themselves on the 
 
72  Ibid., 200. 
73  Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan Being the Memoirs of Count K.K. Pahlen, 
1908-1909, 101. 
74  G. Curzon, “The Transcaspian Railway,” Proceedings of the Royal 
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ground with their foreheads in the dust.”76 The memory of the loss to 
Russia proved too much to bear for the native inhabitants of the 
region. To build the Trans-Caspian and Orenburg Railroads, cheap 
Central Asian labor became the norm. Yet a fear arose that too many 
local natives employed to construct the railway would be dangerous, 
so the Imperial Russia employed a vast amount of Russian labor that, 
in turn, replaced the locals. By the time of completion of the 
Orenburg section there were 5,094 employed Russians, and only 948 
natives. Additional issues occurred as a result of wage differences, as 
the locals received a fraction of what Russian garnered. Both sides 
frequently did not receive their wages. This led to confrontations 
between the two groups and incited the growth of the Turkestan 
intelligentsia, who, after the 1905 Revolution, began to use the press 
to advance the ideas of nationalism amongst the native populace and 
the discrepancies between them.77  
Although Turkestan experienced strikes prior to 1905, after the 
revolution protests occurred more frequently. This can be attributed, 
once again, to the railway. The Russian Empire permitted strikes after 
the 1905 Revolution and one can see a significant growth in protest to 
less than satisfactory work conditions. Beginning in 1895 and until 
the revolution, “there had been 270 strikes at cotton factories with 
197,139 participants who left work for a total of 945,686 worker 
hours.” Consequently, “in 1905, just in the cotton textile industry, 
there were 1,008 strikes, 784,058 strikers, and 8,329,352 worker 
hours lost.”78 The numbers rose once again by 1912 when, “one 
hundred thirty-five thousand cotton workers would go on strike … 
76  Curzon, “The Transcaspian Railway,” 284. 
77  Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 1865-1923, 121. To fully 
grasp the magnitude of the situation that the Trans-Caspian and Orenburg Railway 
contributed to the problems in the city one should consider the chapter entitled 
Migration, Class, and Colonialism as well as The Predicaments of “Progress,” 1905-
1914. 
78  Pretty, “The Cotton Industry in Russia and the Soviet Union,” 28. 
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followed by 180 thousand in 1913; during the first half of 1914, 233 
thousand cotton workers struck for a total of over two million worker 
hours lost, a greater total in six months than in any year except 
1905.”79 These measures for the modernization of Central Asia 
undoubtedly contributed to the growth of self-awareness in the 
inhabitants of Turkestan, and surely influenced the ability to harvest 
cotton. In spite of the monumental growth of the Turkestan cotton 
industry, “Central Asian cotton was [still] 50 percent more expensive 
in Moscow in 1913 than American cotton on sale in St. Petersburg.”80 
 
Conclusion: The Russian Nationalists’ Miscalculation 
When taking into consideration the events that occurred in 
Turkestan from the 1870s until the 1890s the region’s significant 
growth in cotton production is impressive. However, these procedures 
hindered the ability to maximize the harvest in the area and ultimately 
the rise in production perhaps had more to do with the total sown area 
for cotton. For instance, it was noted that the total cultivated area of 
Turkestan far surpassed the sown area of the United States. Perhaps 
the Russian nationalists focused on the production of 1907 where the 
region produced slightly over 9 million poods. This is a remarkable 
increase from the 1899 figure of 2.2 million poods.81 What may have 
contributed to the beliefs of the Russian Nationalist Party is that in 
1909, the year the party formed, Turkestan had 300,000 desiatinas82 
under cultivation that yielded almost 11 million poods. By 1911 the 
region had 377,000 desiatinas dedicated to cotton; this produced just 
over 13 million poods, which constituted close to 50 percent of the 
Russian textile industry’s needs.83 However, at its peak in 1915 
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Turkestan produced 14 million poods of cotton on 524,000 desiatinas, 
of the necessary 23 million needed to sustain the textile industry.84 
The increase in cotton yields also coincides with the rise in sown area. 
Thus, it demonstrates that the growth of the harvest relied 
significantly on the expansion of cultivated land. 
This increase in production, and in sown area, surely contributed 
to the nationalists’ declaration that “the production of cotton in 
Turkestan is increasing and has reached such dimensions that Russia 
will not be in need of American cotton in the very near future.”85 The 
Russian nationalists must not have taken into consideration the impact 
of events of the late nineteenth century on the people of Central Asia, 
nor the approach at implementing policy to maximize the potential of 
the region. Nevertheless, production never approached the amount the 
Russian nationalists needed to create a ‘Russia for Russians’ and 
economic independence. Additionally, the Russian nationalist desire 
for economic self-sufficiency and confrontation with the United 
States appears to conflict with the idea proposed by Robert Edelman, 
who stated, “the Nationalists were not especially concerned with 
deflecting attention from internal antagonisms by focusing on external 
enemies,” and “the Russian Nationalist Party approached international 
politics with surprising confusion and silence.”86  
Yet further studies are warranted on their involvement in the 
attempt to gain financial autonomy from the United States and their 
involvement in international dealings. Additional work must also 
address the view of where Turkestan stood in the grand scheme of a 
84  Whitman, Turkestan Cotton in Imperial Russia, 203. It was estimated in the 
article “Shooting at One’s Own People,” from 1911, that 23 million poods were 
required, but the amount in 1915 may have increased. 
85  NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6, 711.612/87, “Abrogation of the Treaty of 
1832,” Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30, 1911; Among the 
Different Newspapers, “Russkoye Slovo.” 
86 Edleman, Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution: The 
Nationalist Party 1907-1917, 193-196. 
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Russia for Russians, particularly when one considers the nationalists’ 
perceptions of the financial wellbeing of Jews in the western 
borderlands and that the noblemen were agriculturalists. Was the 
region to be incorporated as a part of the empire, or to be considered 
an autonomous region that fed the Russian textile industry? The 
answers to such questions will only aid the scholarship of the Russian 
nationalists and their wish of economic liberation from the United 
States. 
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